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VALIDITY OF OIL AND GAS LEASES
W. L. Su-mmxs
The validity of oil and gas leases has been questioned by courts in
several jurisdictions because of the lack of mutuality of consideration.
In order to understand the theories and principles upon which these
decisions are based, it is necessary to briefly trace the evolution of oil
and gas leases from the infancy of the industry to the present time.
The, first leases for oil and gas purposes were modeled after leases for
solid mineral. They were granted for a long, definite term, ranging
from fifteen to ninety-nine years. If they contained a recital of an
initial cash consideration, it was usually a nominal one.
1 In this early
period there was no steady market for the consumption of petroleum
products. There was no large organization of capital engaged in the
business of production. Operations were conducted by lessees of
limited means, under leases of small tracts of land. Although the cost
'Chic. & A. Co. v. U. S. Pet. Co. (1868) 57 Pa. 83 ($I consideration, 20 year
term, express covenant to drill in i2o days); Karnes v. Tanner (187o) 66 Pa.
297 ($500 consideration, 5o year term, express covenant to drill within one year) ;
Allison's Appeal (1874) 77 Pa- 221 (2o year term); Brown v. Vandergriff
(1875) 8o Pa. St. 142 ($225 consideration, 2o year term, express covenant to drill
within 6o days); Appeal of Stoughton (1878) 88 Pa. i98 (21 year term);
Monroe v. Armstrong (188o) 96 Pa. 307 (2o year term, express covenant to drill
within io days) ; Kitchen v. Smith (1882) ior Pa. 452 (15 year term, express
covenant to drill within 4 months); Duke v. Hague (1884) lO7 Pa. 57 (2o year
term, express covenant to drill) ; Brown v. Beecher (I888) 120 Pa. 590, 15 Atl.
6o8 (no cash consideration, 15 year term, express covenant to drill) ; Wash. Gas
Co. v. Johnson (1889) 123 Pa. 576, 16 AtI. 799 (no cash consideration, 2o year
term, express covenant to drill within 6 months) ; Wills v. Mfrs.! Nat. Gas Co.
(1889) 130 Pa. 222, 18 Atl. 721 ($I consideration, 2o year term, express covenant
to drill within 9o days); Thompson v. Ridelsperger (18gi) 144 Pa. 416, 22 Atl.
826 (i5 year term, express covenant to drill within 2o years) ; McNish v. Stone
(1879) 152 Pa. 457, 25 AtI. 732 (no cash consideration, 99 year term, express
covenant to drill within 6 months) ; Duffield v. Rosenzweig (1891) 144 Pa. 520,
23 AtI. 4 (15 year term, express covenant to drill within 3o days); McKnight v.
Mfrs.' Nat. Gas Co. (1892) 146 Pa. 185, 23 Atl. 164 ($1 cash consideration, 20
year term, express covenant to drill within i8 months); Venture Oil Co. v.
Fretts (1893) 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atl. 732 (2o year term, express covenant to drill
within six months); Sanders v. Sharp (1893) 153 Pa- 555, 25 Atl. 524 (2o year
term, express covenant to drill in one year) ; Nesbit v. Godfrey (1893) 155 Pa.
251, 25 At. 621 ($75 cash consideration, 21 year term) ; Wood County Pet. Co.
'. W. Va. Trans. Co. (1886) 28 W. Va. 21o (15 year term, express covenant to
drill within 6o days); Wagner v. Mallory (19o2) 16p N. Y. 5O, 62 N. E. 584
(40 year term); Pet. Co. v. Coal, Coke 6 Mfg. Co. (i8go) 89 Tenn. 381, i8
S. W. 65 (no cash consideration, 99 year term, covenant to test the property within
three years). But some of the earlier leases stated no definite term, see Funk v.
Haldeman (1866) 53 Pa. 229; Dark v. Johnston (1867) 55 Pa. 164; Rynd v.




of drilling wells in the shallow sands of the Pennsylvania field were
not so great as at present, yet, considering the amount of capital of the
lessee, the uncertainty of markets and transportation, an over-estima-
tion of the physical characteristics of oil and gas, and the lack of
scientific knowledge available for the location of wells, the business
was a highly speculative one. The controlling motive which induced
the making of these leases on the part of the lessor and lessee undoubt-
edly was the thought of immediate production and the securing of
their respective shares of the oil and gas. The leases of this period,
therefore, usually contained recitals to the effect that they were made in
consideration of the covenants of the lease. The principal covenants
to which this recital referred were those on the part of the lessee for
immediate development to "success or abandonment" and the payment
of royalties. 2
The courts in construing the oil and gas leases of this period in the
light of the above mentioned facts and conditions evolved four principles
of construction, namely; that the prospective royalties are the moving
consideration to the lessor which supports the lease;' in absence of a
covenant for early development a condition is implied that the lessee
develop within a reasonable time on the penalty of a forfeiture of his
' See cases cited supra in note i.
'Funk v. Halden, supra note I; Huggins v. Daley (igoo, C. C. A. 4th) 99
Fed. 6o6; Steelsmith v. Gartlan (1898) 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978, 44 L. R. A.
1O7; Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, supra note i; Crawford v. Ritchey (1897) 43
W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 22o; Plummer v.- Hillside Coal Co. (1894) 16o Pa. 483, 28
Atl. 853; Kelley v. Keys (igo6) 213 Pa. 295, 62 Atl. g91; Foster v. Elk Fork
0. & G. Co. (i898 C. C. A. 4th) 90 Fed. 178; Childers v. Neely (1899) 47
W. Va. 70, 34 S. E. 825; Lawson v. Kirchner (19o) 50 W. Va. 344, 40 S. E.
344; Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co. (1902) 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S. E.
655; Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley (1903) 53 W. Va. 5O1, 44 S. E. 422;
Headley v. Hoopengarner (19o6) 6o W. Va. 626, 55 S. E. 144; Florence Oil Co.
v. Orinun (903) 19 Colo. App. 79, 73 Pac. 628; Fed. Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co.
(1902, C. C. D. Ind.) 112 Fed. 373, aff'd (1902) 121 Fed. 674; Rich v. Doneghey
(1918) 71 Okla. 2o4, 177 Pac. 86, 3 A. L. R. 352, dissent, Owen, J.; Nat'l. o. &
P. L. Co. v. Teel (1902) 95 Tex. 586, 68 S. W. 979; Gadbury v. Ohio & Ind. Gas
Co. (igo3) 162 Ind. 9, 67 N. E. 259, 62 L. R. A. 895; Cowan v. Radford Iron Co.
(1887) 83 Va. 547, 3 S. E. i2o; Knight v. Ind. C. & I. Co. ('1874) 47 Ind. i1O,
17 Am. Rep. 692; Roberts v. McFaddin (1903) 32 Tex. Civ. App. 47, 74 S. W.
iii; Guffey Pet. Co. v. Oliver (io4, Tex. Civ. App.) 79 S. W. 884; Wither-
spoon v. Staley (1913, Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S, W. 557; Sminth v. Guffey (ii
C. C. A. 7th) 2o2 Fed. iog; Owens v. Corsciana Pet. Co. (1914, Tex. Civ. App.)
i69 S. W. 193; Long v. Sun Co. (1913) 132 La. 6oi, 61 So. 684; Gt. Western
Oil Co. v. Carpenter (19o6) 43 Tex. Civ. App. 229, 95 S. W. 57; Dill v. Fraze
(igo7) 169 Ind. 53, 79 N. E. 971; Ohio Oil Co. v. Detanore (9o5) 165 Ind. 243,
73 N. E. 9o7; Jennings-Heywood Synd. v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co. (19o7) i1g
La. 793, 44 So. 481; Murray v. Barnhart (19o6) 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 492;
Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander (1911) 97 Ark. 167, 133 S. W. 837; Berry v.
Frisbie (1905) 120 Ky. 337, 86 S. W. 558; Bay St. Pet. Co. v. Penn Lubricating
Co. (1905) 121 Ky. 637, 87 S. W. 11o2; Flanagan v. Marsh (igo, Ky.) 105
S. W. 424; Bettrman v. Harness (1896) 42 W. Va. 432, 26 S. E. 271.
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lease ; equity will enforce a forfeiture of an oil and gas lease contrary
to the usual rule that equity abhors a forfeiture ;5 oil and gas leases are
construed in favor of the lessor contrary to the common law rule under
which they would be construed against him.6
Perhaps no one realized the future of petroleum products, yet, with
the gradual demand for them, it was foreseen by some thai a growing
and stabilized market could be supplied only by well-regulated and steady
production. This, in turn, cotld only be accomplished by the organi-
zation of capital into units of sufficient strength to permit the.leasing
of large tracts of land, to hold, prospect and develop as the conditions
of market or certainty of production warranted. But these objects
could not be accomplished if the lessee was bound by a duty of imme-
diate development of each tract under lease or have the liability of loss
of his leases for failure to perform this duty.
These conditions necessitated a change in the lease relieving the lessee
from the necessity of immediate development. To accomplish this
result a new type of drilling clause was evolved, which later came to
be known as the "drill or pay" clause.7  By this clause, the lessee
covenanted to drill or commence drilling a well within a certain time,
dependent somewhat upon the proved or unproved character of the
territory for oil and gas, or in lieu thereof to pay a delay rental until
such well was drilled. In connection with the "drill or pay" clause
there was usually a provision for forfeiture of the lease for failure of
the lessee to drill or pay. This type of lease proved satisfactory for a
time, due largely to a mistake on the part of both the lessors and the
'McKnight v. Mfrs.! Nat. Gas Co., supra note I; Klepner v. Lemon (1896)176 Pa. 502, 35 Atl. lo9; Aye v. Phila. Co. (1899) 193 Pa. 451, 44 At. 555;Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder (19oo) io6 Fed. 764; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co. (1897)
57 Ohio St. i8, 48 N. E. 5o2; Gadbury v. Ohio & Ind. Gas Co., supra note 3;Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Littler (i9o4) 162 Ind. 320, 7o N. E. 363; Brewsterv. Lanyon Zinc Co. (19o5, C. C. A. 8th) 14o Fed. 8oi; Parish Fork Oil Co. v.Bridgewater Gas Co., supra note 3; Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Oliver, supra note 3;Logan Nat. Gas Co. v. Gt. So. G. & 0. Co. (19o3. C. C. A. 6th) 126 Fed. 623;
Kellar v. Craig (19o3. C. C. A. 4th) 126 Fed. 63o; Acme Oil Co. v. Williams
(1903) 140 Calif. 681, 74 Pac. 296; Phillips v. Hamilton (i9o8) 17 Wyo. 41, 95Pac. 846; Vendocia Oil Co. v. Robinson (195o) 71 Ohio St. 3o2, 73 N. E. 222;Koch's & Balliett's Appeal (i88o) 93 Pa. 434; Powers v. Bridgeport Oil Co.
(19o9) 238 I11. 397, 84 N. E. 381.
'Brown v. Vandergrift (1875) 8o Pa. I42; Munroe v. Arnstrong (i88o) "96Pa. 307; Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., supra note 3; Brewster v.Lanyon Zinc Co., supra note 4; Guffey Pet. Co. v. Oliver, supra note 3.'Allison's Appeal, supra note i; Brown v. Vandergrift, supra note 5; Galey v.Kellerman (1889) 123 Pa. 491, 16 Atl. 474; Western Pa. Gas Co. v. George(1894) I61 Pa. 47, 28 AtI. 1004; Kleppner v. Lemon (1896) 176 Pa. 502, 35 Atl.iog; Kennedy v. Crawford (i8gi) 138 Pa. 561, 21 Atl. i9; Steelsmith v. Gartlan,
supra note 3; Bettman v. Harness, supra note 3.
'See Appeal of Wills (1889) 13o Pa. 235, 18 At. 724, and Ray v. Western Pa.Gas Co. (18gi) 138 Pa. 576, 2o Atl. io65, for early forms of the "drill or pay"
clause.
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lessees of their true legal relations thereunder. They acted upon the
assumption that a failure to drill or pay delay rental by the lessee
brought the lease to an end. But in 1889, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the forfeiture provision in the "drill or pay"
lease was for the benefit of the lessor only, and that the lessor, in the
event that 'the lessee had failed to drill or pay, could waive the for-
feiture and sue for the rent for the term of the lease." After this
decision it was apparent that the "drill or pay" lease with a long definite
term was not what the interest of the business from the standpoint of
the lessee demanded. Under such a lease, he might find himself bound
to pay a delay rental for a long period of years, although the land had
long since been proven worthless for oil and gas purposes. Perhaps
the first measure of relief from this situation was accomplished by short-
ening the length of the fixed term to five or ten years, with a clause
providing that in the event of production within that time the lease
should continue as long as oil and gas were produced in paying
quantities. But even this change was not wholly satisfying from the
standpoint of the lessee.. Land might prove worthless for oil and gas
purposes by a test made in the vicinity, and he would still be bound to
pay rentals for -five or ten years without any hope of return.
Relief from this burden was accomplished in two ways. One was
by the addition of a-"surrender" clause
9 to the "drill or pay" clause, and
the other, by the use of the "unless"'
1 drilling clause. Under either of
these types of leases, the lessee had the power to terminate the lease
when the land proved to be of no value for oil and gas purposes.
Where the "or" type of drilling clause was used in conjunction with
the "surrender" clause, the lessee was either bound to drill or pay until
some operative act by either the lessor or the lessee brought the lease
to an" end. If the lessee failed to drill or to pay, the lessor might declare
a forfeiture and cancel the lease, or he might waive the forfeiture and
sue for the rent. The lessee could terminate the lease and escape these
obligations only by the act of surrendering it, having first paid up the
accrued rentals, and tendered the cash consideration required as condi-
'Galey v. Kellerman, supra note 6.
' "And it is further agreed that the second parties, their heirs or assigns, shall
have the right at anytime to surrender up this lease, and be released from all
moneys due and conditions unfulfilled; then and from that time this lease and
agreement shall be null and void and no longer binding on either party." "Sur-
render" clause in Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co. (I899) 47 W. Va. 84,
86, 34 S. E. 923, 924.
10 "Provided, however, that this lease shall become null and void, and all rights
thereunder shall cease and determine, unless a well be completed on the premises
within one year from the date hereof, or unless the lessee shall pay at the rate of
three hundred and fifty dollars quarterly in advance for each additional three
months such completion is delayed from the time above mentioned for the comple-
tion of such well, until a well is completed." "Unless" drilling clause used in
Snodgrass v. South Penn Oil Co. (19oo) 47 W. Va. 509, 35 S. E. 820.
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tion precedent to the exercise of his option to surrender. On the other
hand, the "unless" lease terminated by its own terms if the lessee failed
to drill within the exploratory period. The only act required by the
lessee to bring about such termination was the mere failure to either
drill or pay. The lessee was not liable for rent, and the lessor was
under no duty to declare a forfeiture. The lessee might, however,
renew the lease from time to time by a periodical payment of rent in
advance.
The introduction of the "drill or pay" clause with the "surrender"
clause and the "unless" clause brought about another change in leases.
The lessor could no longer depend upon the lessee's covenant for imme-
diate development, and the payment of royalties as consideration for his
grant to the lessee. Therefore, by way of inducement to him, there
was instituted the practice of paying an initial cash consideration of
more than a nominal sum. This amount depended largely upon the
prospective value of the land for oil and gas purposes. The continu-
ance of this practice may have been to some extent affected in some
jurisdictions because the courts questioned the sufficiency of a nominal
consideration to support leases of the "drill or pay" or "unless" type.
While the foregoing discussion shows that since the beginning of the
oil and gas industry there has been a constant change in the terms of
oil and gas leases to meet the conditions of the industry, with the result
of developing the two standard types known as the "drill or pay" and
the "unless" lease, yet the litigation shows that by no means have all of
the questions of validity of leases been concerned with these standard
types. A lease may not recite a cash consideration, and if it does, it
may be nominal, or substantial, paid or unpaid; the term may be long,
short, or for an indefinite time; the drilling dause may contain an
express covenant for immediate development, may employ the "or"
clause, with or without the "surrender" clause, the "unless" clause, or
contain no covenant at all for development, except such as is implied
by the courts; the "surrender" clause when used may not require
a consideration as condition precedent to its exercise, or it may require
the payment of a nominal or a substantial sum, or may have a further
condition attached that it becomes void upon the bringing of any suit
by the lessee to enforce the lease. Considering the above clauses as the
ones upon which the courts have usually tested the validity of oil and
gas leases from the standpoint of mutuality of consideration, one can
readily appreciate the variety of situations which might arise from the
possible combinations of them. The situations which have arisen, how-
ever, as will appear by the discussion to follow, have not been of great
variety.
The wave of litigation, wherein the validity of oil and gas leases was
seriously questioned because of their optional features, had its begin-
ning a short time before igoo. These leases were attacked upon two
theories. The first being that under the "drill or pay" lease with "sur-
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render" clause, or the "unless" lease, the estate created might be brought
to an end at the option of the lessee, it was likewise terminable at the
option of the lessor. The second theory was that since the oil and
gas lease, because of the fact that it was an executory contract, unper-
formed because the consideration moving to the lessor was the promise
of the payment of royalties and since because of the presence of the
"surrender" clause in the "or" lease or under the "unless" lease the
lessee was not bound to perform the contract, it fell within that maxim,
that: "Contracts unperformed, optional as to one of the parties, are
optional as to both." And therefore, because lacking in mutuality of
consideration, was void.
The foundation for this first line of reasoning was unwittingly laid
by Lord Coke in his Cbmmentary on Littleton. Littleton"- stated that,
"Tenant at will is, where lands or tenements are let by one man to
another, to have and to hold to him at the will of the lessor, by the
force of which lease the lessee is in possession." This definiton was
followed by Blackstone,12 Kent' 3 and other authorities.
14  But Lord
Coke in commenting upon this statement in Littleton, after remarking
that a lease at the will of the lessor was implied in law to be at the will
of the lessee also, added: "And so it is when the lease is made to have
and to hold at the will of the lessee, this must also be at the will of
the lessor; and so are all the books that seem prima fade to differ,
cleerly reconciled."'15
This statement by Coke has been explained by Leake,
16 "as meaning
a lease without livery or other sufficient conveyance of a freehold
estate." If not so explained, Coke's statement is directly contrary to
the law as established by the cases in England and in this country, for
it is well settled that a grant of an estate in fee, for life or for years,
with an added power in the lessee or grantee to terminate the estate at
will, is not an estate at the will of the lessor or grantor also, but simply
an estate in the grantee or lessee in fee, for life or for years with power
to terminate it.'7  But despite the explanation as to the meaning of
Coke, Littleton sec. 68.
2 Blackstone, Comnentaries, *145.
134 Kent, Commentaries, *III.
' i Leake, Land Law (1874) 206; Williams, Real Property (22d ed. 1914) 509;
I Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) secs. 60, 61; 1 Tiffany, Landlord and
Tenant (igo) sec. 13; I Washburn, Real Property (6th ed. I9o2). sec. 762; 2
Reeves, Real Property (19o9) sec. 659.
"' Coke, loc. cit.
lei Leake, op. cit. 206 note b. See also 2 Reeves, loc. cit.; 1 Tiffany, Real
Property (2d ed. 1920) sec. 61; Effinger v. Lewis (1859) 32 Pa. 367.
11 Tiffany, Real Property supra, secs. 61c, 32, 59c, 93; Beeson v. Burton
(0852, C. P.) 12 C. B. 647, 136 Eng. Rep. 1057; In re King's Leasehold Estates
(1873) L. R. 16 Eq. 521; Zimbler v. Abrahams [i9o3] i K. B. 577; Lewis v.
Reed (1881) 74 Ind. 433; Effinger v. Lewis, supra note 16; Ely v. Randall
(1897) 68 Minn. 177, 7o N. W. 980; Gilmore v. Hamilton (1882) 83 Ind. 196;
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Lord Coke's dictum, some American courts have been misled by it.:8
In Cheever v. Pearson,19 where a grantee's interest in certain lands
was terminable by his removal of a building thereon, it was held to
be a lease terminable at the will of ihe lessee. But the court added:
"This being so, the rule is settled, and has been unquestioned from
Lord Coke's time to the present, that every lease at will must, in law,
be at the will of both parties. Therefore when a lease is made to hold
at the will of the lessee, it must also be at the will of the lessor. '20  In
Doe v. Richards,2' where an instrument gave one an interest in land
at his own will, the court quoted the dictum of Lord Coke and relying
upon it and Cheever v. Pearson, supra, held that the interest of the
tenant was terminable at the will of the lessor or his assigns by notice
to quit. In Knight v. Indiandt Coal & Iron Co.,22 the action was one to
quiet title by a lessor of coal lands as against his lessee under a lease in
which the lessee had a power to surrender. The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought on the ground that since the
interest created was at the will of the lessee it was at the will of the
lessor also. The court relied upon Doe v. Richards, supra, and the
authorities cited therein, and boldly asserted that "a lease or estate
which is at the will of one of the parties is equally at the will of the
other party," and quoted from Blackstone and Kent to prove this state-
ment without seeming to note that the statements of those writers were
based upon an estate at the will of the lessor.23
In direct reliance upon Knight v. Indiana Coal & Iron Co., supra, and
Doe v. Richards, supra, the Virginia court in Cowan v. Radford Iron
Co.,24 where under a lease for mining ore the lessee had the power to
terminate the lease at any time by the removal of machinery and build-
Thomas v. Thomas (1866) 17 N. 3. Eq. 356; Warner v. Tanner (1882) 38 Ohio
St. 118; Thompson v. Baxter (igog) lO7 Minn. 122, ii N. W. 797, 21 L. R. A.
(r. s.) 575, and note; Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (191o) sec. 13, note 362.
" Clieever v. Pearson (834) 33 Mass. 266; Doe v. Richards (1853) 4 Ind. 374;
Knight v. Ind. C. & I. Co. (1874) 47 Ind. 1O5; Western Trans. Co. v. Lansing
(1872) 49 N. Y. 499; Cowan v. Radford Iron Co. (1887) 83 Va. 547, 3 S. E. 120.
" Supra note 18.
Here the Massachusetts court cited Coke, loc. cit.
Supra note 18.
"Supra note 18.
The court here quoted 2 Blackstone, loc. cit. supra note 12, where it is said
"But every estate at will, is at will of both pirties, landlord and tenant; so that
either of them may determine his will, and quit his connedtion with the other at his
own pleasure." Had the learned court read the second sentence above the onequoted he would have surely understood that in the sentence quoted, Blackstone by
"estate at will" clearly meant an estate at the will of the lessor. The same may
be said of the reference to the quotation from 4 Kent, loc. cit. supra note 13; 1
Washburn, Real Property (3d ed. 1868) 503 is relied upon and is really misleading,
for the author citing Coke, loc. cit. supra note 15, and Smith, Landlord and
Tenant 15, says: "An estate at will in lands is that which a tenant has by entry
thereon under a demise to hold during the joint wills of the parties to the same."
"Supra note i8.
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ings placed upon the land, held that in a bill by the lessor to cancel or
rescind the lease, the lessor should recover because being at the will of
the lessee the estate was equally at the will of the lessor.
The first oil and gas case in which this erroneous dictum of Coke was
adhered to was Eclipse Oil v. South Penn Oil Co.
2 5 In that case the
lease was for the term of three years and as long thereafter as oil and
gas could be produced in paying quantities. The lease did not contain
an acknowledgment or recital of a cash consideration but did contain
a recital that it was made in consideration of the "covenants and agree-
ments hereinafter mentioned." Such covenants were the promises of
the lessee to pay oil royalties and gas rentals and to drill a test well upon
the premises within six months, or in lieu thereof, thereafter to pay
one dollar per acre per annum until such well was, completed. The
lease also contained a clause providing for forfeiture of the lease if
the well was not drilled or the rental paid, and a clause giving power
to the lessee to surrender the lease at any time and be thereafter released
from all obligations. The lessee did not drill during the first six
months, but he did pay the delay rental within time so that there were
no grounds for forfeiture. The lessor, however, about a year after the
first lease, made a second lease and the senior lessee brought a bill in
equity against the junior lessee seeking to enjoin him from drilling
for oil and gas. One of the principal grounds upon which the court
held that the senior lessee was not entitled to the relief sought was that
because of the "surrender" clause in the lease giving the lessee power
to terminate the lease at will the interest created was merely a tenancy
at will and was equally terminable by the lessor, and that the act of
making the second lease by which that will was expressed terminated
the prior lease. In reaching this conclusion the court relied upon Doe v.
Richards, Knight v. Indiana Coal & Iron Co., and Cowan v. Radford
Iron Co., supra, and very naturally made the same errors as were made
in those cases.2 6 In later cases the West Virginia court has held that
similar leases containing a recital or acknowledgment of an initial cash
consideration did not create a tenancy at will. Viewed as a contract,
of course the cash consideration made the lease a binding option and
prevented the lessor from cancelling it, but if the surrender clause had
had the effect contended for in Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co.,
"Supra note 9. See also Trees v. Eclipse Oil Co. (1899) 47 W. Va. 107, 34
S. E. 933, where it was held that a similar lease creating merely a tenancy at will
was terminated by the death of the lessor.
" In speaking of the interest created by the lease the court said: "It therefore
created a mere estate at their will, and, being at their will, it was at the will of the
lessor, also. There is no .escape from this conclusion, and it has been the law,
undisputed, from time immemorial. Bl. Comm. 145; 4 Kent, Comm. iii; Wash-
burn, Real Prop. 505; Co. Inst. 55a." 47 W. Va. at p. 95, 34 S. E. at p. 928.
This shows that the court was completely deceived by its slavish adherence to
the Indiana and Virginia cases.
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supra, it is difficult to imagine how the payment of one dollar or a
thousand dollars could make any change.17
In Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co.,28 the lease stated no term,
acknowledged a consideration of $i, contained an "unless" drilling
clause and a "surrender" clause. The lessee did not commence drilling
within the exploratory period, which was only one day, but did pay or
tender the monthly installments to- keep the lease alive. The lessor
refused to receive the eighth payment, made a new lease and placed the
lessee in possession. The first lessee brought a bill in equity to remove
'the cloud upon his title and for injunction. This relief was denied upon
several grounds. One of them was that since the lessee by the surren-
der clause had power to terminate the lease the interest created was a
tenancy at will and that the lessor likewise had such power which he
had exercised by making the second lease and placing the lessee in
possession. For this holding the court relied upon Knight v. Indiana
Coal & Iron Co., supra.
But in Brown v. Fowler,29 decided in the same year as Federal Oil
Co. v. Western Oil Co., supra, the Ohio Court took a different view.
The lease, which was for a term of two years and as long thereafter
as oil and gas was found in paying quantities, provided that it could not
extend beyond twenty five years, acknowledged the receipt of $i con-
sideration, contained an "unless" drilling clause and a "surrender"
clause. Before the end of the two year period the lessor made a similar
lease to a second lessee, claiming that the first lease was void. The
assignees of the first lease commenced an action against the second
lessee and the lessor to enjoin them from drilling on the premises, and
the second lessee filed a cross petition to prevent the senior lessee from
'Pyle v. Henderson (igog) 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. '762; Harness v. Eastern
Oil Co. (9O) 49 W. Va. 250, 38 S% E. 662; Lowther Oil Co. v. Guffey (19o3)
52 W. Va. 88, 43 S. E. ioi; Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co. (1911) 68 W. Va. 667, 70
S. E. 707, Ann. Cas. I912B, 360. In the last case cited the court in speaking of
Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co. and Trees v. Eclipse Oil Co., said: "Those
cases proceed upon the idea that there was no binding leases; that there was no
obligation, no promise on the part of the lessee to pay money or to do anything,
and a privilege to surrender the leases without payment of anything, at mere will;
that they conferred only an estate at the will of the lessee, and that, the estate
being one at will, it might be terminated by either party; that there was no con-
sideration for the lease. * * * In the lease before us we find a valuable considera-
tion paid, as it recites the payment of $i down. * * * But that $i is not the only
consideration; for the lease provided that the lessee shall drill wells, and from
them pay royalty, or on the failure to do that pay $go per year. * ** So that the
lessee by not exercising the privilege of surrender, paid large amounts as yearly
rental, accepted by Lovett this was valuable consideration, in addition to the $i,
and would bar Lovett from holding the lease a mere option without consideration,
a mere estate at will terminable whenever Lovett chose."
'Supra note 3. The Court did not seem to notice that the unless drilling clause
gives the lessee the option to terminate the estate at will as well as does the
surrender clause.
"(igo2) 65 Ohio St. 5o7, 63 N. E. 76.
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drilling. The controversy was decided against the senior lessee on the
ground that his lease had expired by its own terms, but it was strongly
urged that the first lease was a tenancy at will and therefore terminable
by the lessor by his act of making the 'econd lease. The court held
that the lease did not, because of the surrender clause or the optional
nature of the "unless" drilling clause, make the interest created a ten-
ancy at will terminable by the will of either party. It pointed out very
clearly the error made in Doe v. Richards, supra, and persisted in other
cases discussed above, had been due to the fact that in making use of
the statement, found in Blackstone, Kent and other authorities, that a
tenancy at will is terminable at the will of either party, the courts had
overlooked the fact that this rule of law is based upon the assumption
that a tenancy at the will of the lessor had been created, and not, as in
an oil and gas lease with a "surrender" clause where in effect there was
a tenancy for years with a power to terminate the lease before the expir-
ation of the term by the lessee only. This error was further explained
in a later Ohio case.80
Following the lead of the Ohio court in Brown v. Fowler, supra, the
Federal courts and the courts of the other states, except in some early
decisions in Oklahoma and Texas, the erroneous doctrine that an oil
and gas lease giving the lessee a power to surrender created a tenancy
at will terminable by the lessor at any time, has not been recognized. 31
In Indiana, where the lease was practically the same as that in Federal
Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., supra, Knight v. Indiana Coal & Iron Co.,
supra, was distinguished on the ground *that the subject matter in the
earlier Indiana case was solid minerals and the principles there
announced were not applicable to a lease for oil and gas.8 2  In Illinois,
11 Cent. Ohio Nat. G. & F. Co. v. Eckert (1904) 70 Ohio St. 127, 71 N. E. 283.
The court here relied upon Eflnger v. Lewis (1859) 32 Pa. 367 to explain the
dictum of Lord Coke.
' Rechard v. Cowley (i918) 2o2 Ala. 337, 8o So. 419; Dunway v. Galbraith
(199) 139 Ark. 58o, 214 S. W. 33; Lawrence v. Mahoney (92o) 145 Ark. 310,
225 S. W. 340; Rogers v. Magnolia 0. & G. Co. (1922) 156 Ark. 103, 245 S. W.
8o2; Dornon Famns Co. v. Stewart (1923) 157 Ark. 194, 247 S. W. 778;
Grooms v. Minton (1923) 158 Ark. 448, :25o S. W. 543; New American 0. &
M. Co. v. Troyer (19o5) 166 Ind. 402, 76 N. E. 253, 77 N. E. 739; Poe v. Ulrey
(19o8) 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46; Dickey v. Coffeyville V. B. & T. Co. (1904) 69
Kan. io6, 76 Pac. 398; Pittsburg V. P. & B. Brick Co. v. Bailey (19o7) 76 Kan.
42, go Pac. 3o8; Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., supra note 4; Lindley v. Raydure
(1987, E. D. Ky.) 239 Fed. 928, aff'd; Raydure v. Lindley (1918, C. C. A. 6th)
249 Fed. 675; Shaffer v. Marks (1917, E. D. OkI.) 241 Fed. 139; Downey v.
Gooch (8984, E. D. Old.) 24o Fed. 527; McCullough v. Smith (9,7, C. C. A.
8th) 243 Fed. 823; Leeper v. Neely (1923, C. C. A. 6th) 293 Fed. 967; Miller v.
Union G. & 0. Co. (1924, C. C. A. 6th) 295 Fed. 27; Northwestern 0. & G. Co.
vi. Branine (8988) 7, Old. lO7, 175 Pac. 533, 3 A. L. R. 344; Rich v. Doneghey
supra note 3; Corsciana Pet. Co. v. Owens (i92o) 110 Tex. 568, 222 S. W. 854;
Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co. (1988) 68 W. Va. 667, 70 S. E. 707, Ann. Cas. 1912B,
36o; Hinernan v. Baldwin (1923, Mont.) 215 Pac. iO3.
' New American 0. & M. Co. v. Troyer, supra note 31.
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in reliance upon Ohio and Indiana cases, the court held that a surrender
clause in a "drill or pay" lease made on the payment of one dollar
initial consideration did not create a tenancy at will.33  The same view
has been expressed in Kansas, 34 and in Alabama35 on authority of the
Kansas cases. The Federal courts in a number of cases have either
impliedly or expressly repudiated the tenancy at will doctrine.s 6
In Raydure v. Lindley, Judge Cochran, in an able and exhaustive
opinion, holds that the surrender clause in an oil and gas lease does not
effect a tenancy at will in the lessee but an estate on limitation.3 7
In Oklahoma, while perhaps there had been no express adoption of
the theory that an oil and gas lease with power in the lessee to terminate
at will, amounted to a tenancy at will, yet in Kolachny v. Galbreath3l 8
the court refused specific performance of such a lease on the authority
of Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., supra. In Brown v. Wilson,"9
the Oklahoma court, in holding that the initial cash consideration for a
3' "The surrender clause in this lease gave to the lessee an option to surrender it
before the expiration of the term, but it did not give to the lessors an option to
compel a surrender. Such options and contracts are not invalid in the law, and
they do not create a tenancy at will. Brown v. Fowler (19o2) 65 Ohio St. 507,
63 N. E. 76; New Ainerican 0. & M. Co. v. Troyer (1905) 166 Ind. 402, 76
N. E. 253, 77 N. E. 739." Poe v. Ulrey (i9o8) 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46.
" "The lease before us does not create what may be likened to an estate at will,
and permit the lessee at his option to terminate the lease at any time. The lessee
could not arbitrarily declare that a profitable gas or oil well was not paying, and
thus satisfy the condition of the lease above set out respecting surrender."
Dickey v. Coffeyille v. B. & T. Co., supra note 31. See also Pittsburg V. P. &
B. Brick Co. v. Bailey, supra note 31.
"Rechard v. Cowley, supra note 31.
"See federal cases cited supra in note 31.
3 " The other formula or epigram had in mind is after the same order but more
specific. It is that a tenancy at the will of one party is at the will of the other.
The position is that by virtue of the surrender clause the holding by the lessee
under these leases was a tenancy at will; i. e., at the will of the lessee, and hence
at the will of the lessor as well. But such was not the nature of the holding of
the lessee thereunder. He was not a tenant at will. He had no right to hold
thereunder, as long as he willed. In no contingency could he hold for the purpose
of exploration longer than Io years, or, if oil and gas were found, for a longer
time than they could be produced. If either holding was subject to a condition
subsequent, it might be terminated short of the period for which it was to last
by the happening thereof, and possibly the holding for the purpose of exploration
might be terminated by the test well proving dry. The surrender clause merely
provided another contingency for terminating the holding short of such period.
So far, then, the estates granted were not estates at will, but estates on
limitation." Supra note 31.
"(igo) 26 Okla. 772, IIO Pac. 902, 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 451; see also Frank
Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas & Oil Co. (1911) 29 Okla. 719, 119 Pac. 260, 43 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 479; Superior 0. & G. Co. v. Mehlin (igio) 25 Okla. 8og, io8 Pac. 545;
Hill 0. & G. Co. v. White (1916) 53 Okla. 748, 157 Pac. 710; Melton v. Cherokee
0. & G. Co. (1918) 67 Okla. 247, 170 Pac. 69a; Lina 0. & G. Co. v. Pritchard
(1923) 92 Okla. 113, 218 Pac. 863.
' (1916) 58 Okla. 392, i6o Pac. 94, L. R. A. I917B, 1184.
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lease supported only the exploratory period and after that the lessor
might cancel, refused to follow the Ohio, Illinois and Kansas cases
where the tenancy at will doctrine had been repudiated. In North-
western Oil & Gas Co. v. Branine4° and Rich v. Doneghey,41 Brown v.
Wilson was, overruled. In these opinions the tenancy at will doctrine
was declared to be erroneous.
In Texas, the Civil Court of Appeals in a number of decisions has
held that the presence of a "surrender" clause in an oil and gas lease
made it invalid for want of consideration, and from the language of
these cases it may be inferred that they have adopted the notion that
such a clause in a lease created a tenancy at will.42  In Guffey Petro-
leum Co. v. Oliver,43 the court expressly held that a tenancy at will was
created and that the lessor might at any time cancel the lease on pay-
ment or tender to the lessor the value of the services performed on the
land. The doctrine of this case was adopted by the Civil Court of
Appeals in Owens v. Corsciana Petroleum Co.,4" but this latter case
was overruled by the Supreme Court of Texas,45 thus completing the
repudiation in practically all jurisdictions of the erroneous notion that
an oil and gas lease giving power to the lessee to terminate it, creates
a tenancy at will and subject to termination at any time by the lessor.
The second theory upon which the validity of oil and'gas leases contain-
ing optional drilling clauses have been attacked, that is, that such leases
are unperformed optional contracts and void for lack of consideration,
is 'directly traceable to two earlier but unsound theories respecting oil
and gas leases. The first of these last mentioned theories is, that the
'(1918) 7, Okla. 307, 175 Pac. 533, 3 A. L. R. 344-
'So, if it should be held that the grant here is of a freehold interest in the land,
it is valid as such, having been executed with all the formalities necessary, under
our statutes, for the conveyance of an freehold estate, and the instrument there-
fore does not create merely an estate at will. If, on the other hand, the view is
taken that the grant is for a definite term, in the nature of an estate for years, the
fact that it may be sooner terminated, at the option of the lessee, does not convert
the grant from one in the nature of a tenancy for years into one in the nature
of a tenancy at will. In either case, the above rule stated by Coke is not appli-
cable. For these reasons we held in Northwestern Oil & Gas Co. v. Bran'in4
suprta, that the presence of the surrender clause 'did not confer on the lessor the
right to terminate the lease at will.'" Rich v. Doneghey, supra note 3, at p. 219,
177 Pac. I00.
? Nat'l 0. & P. L. Co. v. Teel (i9o2, Tex. Civ. App.) 67 S. W. 545; Roberts
v. McFadden (1903) 32 Tex. Civ. App. 47, 74 S. W. III; Emery v. Leagule
(1903)' 31 Tex. Civ. App. 474, 72 S. W. 6o3; Hodges v. Brice (I9O3) 32 Tex. Civ.
App. 358, 74 S. W. 590; Witherspoon v. Staley (igI, Tex. Civ. App.) 338 S. W.
1193; ibid. (1913) I56 S. W. 557. But see 159 S. W. XXIII where the Supreme
Court refused writ of error on ground that the lease was forfeited and refused to
commit itself on validity. Guffey Pet. Co. v. Oliver (19o4, Tex. Civ. App:) 79
S. W. 884.
"Loc. cit.
(194) 16q S. W. 2oo.
Corsciana Pet. Co. v. Owens, supra note 31.
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interest created by an oil and gas lease is executory until oil and gas
are produced, and the second, that the prospective oil royalties and gas
well rentals are the sole consideration moving from the lessee to the
lessor for the privilege given by him to the lessee to explore for and
produce oil and gas.
The doctrine that an oil and gas lease creates merely an executory or
inchoate interest in the lessee until production had its origin in McNish
v. Stone46 but the principle was restated in Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts
47
and the latter case is generally credited with its origin. In the Fretts
case, a senior lessee who had drilled a dry hole but had done nothing
further for a period of seven years, brought an action of ejectment
against a junior lessee. The defense was abandonment by the senior
lessee. The court recalled the doctrine that, "a vested title cannot
ordinarily be lost by abandonment in less time than that fixed by the
statute of limitations unless there is satisfactory proof of an intention
to abandon." The fact that the parties contemplated immediate develop-
ment, coupled with the lessee's inaction for seven years, would seem to
show that there was no lack of evidence of the lessee's intention to
abandon the lease. The court, however, apparently not satisfied to
place its decision on that ground, announced that oil and gas leases were
an exception to the rule that vested interests could not be abandoned
in a less period than that fixed by the statutes. Then instead of stating
the reason and policy upon which such leases might well be excepted
from the operation of such a rule, that is, the peculiar economic and
physical facts of oil and gas, the court stated that they were an excep-
tion to it because: "The title is iichoate, and for purposes of exploration
only, until oil is found. If it is not found no estate vests in the lessee,
and his title, whatever it is, ends when the unsuccessful search is aban-
doned. If oil is found, then the right to produce becomes a vested
right, and the lessee will be protected in exercising it in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the contracts."
This statement of the Pennsylvania court has been widely quoted
and paraphrased, 48 with the natural result that oil and gas leases have
" (1879) found in footnote to Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, supra note I.
"Supra note i.
0 Hooks v. Forst (895) 155 Pa. 238, 30 At. 846; Chambers v. Smith (1897)
183 Pa. 122, 38 Atl. 522; Ahrens v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co. (1898) 188 Pa. 249,
41 Atl. 739; Colgan v. Forest Oil Co. (1899) 194 Pa. 234, 45 AtI. Ing; Wilson v.
Phila. Co. (1904) 21o Pa. 484, 6o AtI. 149; Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co. (1914)
243 Pa. 128, 89 At!. 823; State v. South Penn Oil Co. (1896) 42 W. Va. 8o, 24
S. E. 688; Crawford v. Ritcley (1897) 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 22o; Steelmnith
v. Gartlan, supra note 6; Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co. (1902) 51
W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655; EasteM Oil Co. vz. Coulelaln (19o9) 65 W. Va. 531, 64
S. E. 836; Garrett v. South Penn Oil Co. (igog) 66 W. Va. 587, 66 S. E. 744;
Harris v. Michael (191o) 70 W. Va. 483, 76 S'. E. 966; Misgrave v. Musgrave
(192o) 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S. E. 302; Heal v. Niagara (1898) 15o Ind. 483, 50
N. E. 482; Rainage v. Wilson (19o9 Ind. App.) 88 N. E. 862; Kokono Nat. Gas
Co. V. Matlock (1912) 177 Ind. 225, 97 N. E. 787; Brookshire Oil Co. v. Casinalia
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been looked upon as executory contracts. Space does not permit criti-
cism of the doctrine here. It is enough, perhaps, to say that, viewing
the oil and gas cases as a whole, the doctrine has proven to be a high
sounding, but false and" misleading statement, which has caused con-
siderable confusion, particularly in the subject of the present inquiry.
Proof of the incongruity of the doctrine is established by decisions to
the effect that oil and gas leases may be abandoned after as well as
before production,49 that the policy rules requiring certain formalities
for the transfer of interests in land which must be complied with on the
execution of the lease,5 0 that immediately upon the execution of the
(199o) 156 Calif 211, 103 Pac. 927; Dickey v. Coffeyville V. B. & T. Co., supra
note 31; Rawlins v. Armel (1905) 70 Kan. 778, 79 Pac. ,68o; Foster v. Elk Fork
0. & G. Co., supra note 3; Huggins v. Daley, supra note 3; Fed. Oil Co. 'v.
Western Oil Co., supra note 31; Payne v. United States ('1921, C. A. D. C.) 269
Fed. 871; Emery v. League, supra note 42; Davis v. Texas Co. (1921, Tex. Civ.
App.) 232 S. W. 549; Kolachny v. Galbreath (191o) 26 Okla. 972, 11o Pac. 9o2;
Brennan v. Hunter (1913) 68 Okla. 112, 172 Pac. 49; Florence 0. & R. Co. v.
Orman (1903) 19 Colo. App. 79, 73 Pac. 628; Conkling v. Krandusky (19o8, 4th
Dept.) 127 App. Div. 761, 112 N. Y. Supp. 13.
"Marnett 0. & G. Co. v. Munsey (1921, Tex. Civ. App.) 232 S. W. 867;
Munsey v. Marnett 0. & G. Co. (1923, Tex.) 254 S. W. 311; Eastern Oil Co. v.
Coulehan (igog) 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836; Harris v. Michael (191z) 70
W. Va. 356, 73 S- E. 934; Sult v. Hochstetter Oil Co. (1908) 63 W. Va. 317, 61
S. E. 307; Buffalo Valley 0. & G. Co. v. Jones (19o7) 75 Kan. 18, 88 Pac. 537;
Heintz v. Shortt (1893) 149 Pa. 286, 28 Atl. 228; Robinson v. Jacobs (1923,
Tex.) 254 S. W. 309; Thomason v. Ham (1923, Tex.) 254 S. W. 316; Caruthers
v. Leonard (1923, Tex. Comm. App.) 254 S. W. 779; Texas Co.'v. Davis (1923,
Tex.) 254 S. W. 304.
' STATUTE OF FRAUDS: Heller v. Dailey (1902) 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490;
Rainage v. Wilson (19o6) 37 Ind. App. 532, 77 N. E. 368; Robinson v. Smalley
(1918) 102 Kan. 842, 171 Pac. 1155; White v. Green (1918) 1O3 Kan. 405, 173
Pac. 974; Beckett-Iseman Oil Co. v. Backer (1915) 165 Ky. 8i8, 178 S. W. 1084;
Prout v. Hoy Oil Co. (1914) 263 Ill. 54, ,05 N. E. 26; Kennedy v. Burns (1919)
84 W. Va. 701, 101 S. E. 156; DeHart v. Enright (1916, Sup. Ct.) 93 Misc. 213,
157 N. Y. Supp. 46; Mont. & W. Oil Co. v. Gibson (1911) 19 Wyo. I, 113 Pac.
784; Priddy v. Green (192o) 220 S. W. 243; Texas Co. v. Tankersley (1921,
Tex. Civ. App.) 2-9 S. V. 672; Canon v. Scott (1921, Tex. Civ. App.) 23o S. W.
lO42; Tupeker v. Deaner (1915) 46 Okla. 328, 148 Pa. 853; contra: Wa!la
Walla 0. G. & P. L. Co. v. Vallentine (1918) 103 Wash. 359, 174 Pac. 980.
LEASE AiUNTS TO SALE OF INFANT'S LANDS: Appeal of Stoughton (1878) 88
Pa. 198; Blakely v. Marshall (1896) 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564; Marshall v.
Mellon (1897) 179 Pa. 371, 36 Atl. 2O; Jennings v. Blomfield (igi) 199 Pa.
638, 49 Atl. 135; McIntosh v. Ropp (I912) 233 Pa. 497, 82 Ad. 949; Wilson v.
Youst (1897) 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 79; South Penn Oil Co. v. McIntyre
(1898) 44 W. Va. 296, 28 S. E. 922; Haskell v. Sutton (1903) 53 'V. Va. 2o6, 44
S. E. 533; but see Duff v. Keaton (1912) 33 Okla. 92, 124 Pac. 291; 42 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 472; Tibbens v. Clayton (1923, E. D. Okla.) 288 Fed. 393; Papoose Oil
Co. v. Swindler (1923, Okla.) 221 Pac. 5o6. A CONVEYANCE OF LAND BY A
MARRIED WOMAN: Columbian Oil Co. v. Blake (1895) 13 Ind. App. 68o, 42 N. E.
234; but see Heal v. Niagara Oil Co. (1898) 150 Ind. 483, 5o N. E. 482;
and Kokono Nat. 0. & G. Co. v. Matlock (1912) 177 Ind. 225, 97 N. E. 787
where the Fretts case was followed. AN ALIENATION OF LAND WITHIN THE
MEANING OF ACTS OF CONGRESS REmOVING RESTRICTIONS ON THE ALIENATION OF
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lease the lessee will be protected in law and equity as against the lessor
or third person who take or attempt to take the oil and gas by operations
on the leased land,51 and finally, by many decisions which have expressly
held that the lessee, immediately upon the execution of the lease,
acquires a vested interest in the land for the purposes thereof 5 2 sub-
ject to be defeated by a breach of condition subsequent.53
ALLOTTED IxDIAN LANDS: Eldred v. Okmulgee L. & T. Co. (19o8) 22 Okla. 742,
98 Pac. 929; Sharp v. Lancaster (igog) 23 Okla. 349, 100 Pac. 578; Barnes v.
Stonebreaker (igog) 28 Okla. 75, 113 Pac. 903; Hoyt v. Fixico (1918) 71 Okla.
,03, 175 Pac. 517; Parker v. Riley (1917,. C. C. A. 8th) 243 Fed. 42; United
States v. Noble (1914) 237 U. S. 7.4, 75 Sup. Ct. 532. A CONVEYANCE OF INTEREST
IN HOmESTEAD: Gillespie v. Fulton 0. & G. Co. (19o8) 236 IIl. 188, 86 N. E. 219;
Bruner v. Hicks (907) 230 III. 536, 82 N. E. 888; Poe v. Ulrey (908) 233 II1.
56, 86 N. E. 84; Franklin Land Co. v. Wea Gas Co. (189o) 43 Kan. 5,8, 23 Pac.
630, ibid. (1895) 54 Kan. 533, 38 Pac. 79o; Palmer 0. & G. Cb. v. Parish (igoo)
61 Kan. 330, 59 Pac. 64o; Thompson v. Milliken (1914) 93 Kan. 72, 143 Pac. 43o;
ibid. (1918) 1O2 Kan. 717, 172 Pac. 534; Peterson v. Skidmore (1921, Kan.) 195
Pac. 6oo; Carter Oil Co. v. Popp (1918, Okla.) 174 Pac. 747; Francen v. Okla.
Oil Co. (192o, Okla.) 194 Pac. 193; Miles v. Jerry (1923, Ark.) 250 S. W. 34;
South Oil Co. v. Colquit (19o2) 28 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 69 S. W. 169; Maynard
v. Gilliam (1920, Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 818; Mclntire v. Thontason (1919,
Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 563; Davis v. Burkholder (I92O, Tex. Civ. App.) 218
S. W. ixoi; Texas Co. v. Keeter (I92o, Tex. Civ. App.) 219 S. W. 521; Fagan
bz. Texas Co. (I92o, Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S. -W. 346; Johnson "v. Russell (192o,
Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S. W. 352; Hamilton Oil Dev. Co. v. Sullivan (192o, Tex.
Civ. App.) 22o S. W. 116; Richmondy. Hog Creek Oil Co. (i921, Tex- Civ. App.)
229 S. W. 563; Carey v. Tex.-Pac. C. & 0. Co. (ig2i, Tex. Civ. App.) 237
S. W. 309; Gary v. McKinney (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 239 S. W. 238; Bell v.
Crabb (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 244 S. W. 371.
" Guffey v. Smith (1914) 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct 526; United States v.
Midway No. 0. Co. (1916, S. D. Calif.) 232 Fed. 619; Isom v. Rex Cride Oil
Co. (19o5) 147 Calif. 659, 82 Pac. 319; Kahle v. Crownt Oil Co. (1913) 18o Ind.
131, ioo N. E. 681; Campbell v. Smith (913) 18o Ind. i59, IOI N. E. 89;
Bryson v. Crown Oil Co. (1916) 185 -Ind. 156, 112 N. E. I; New Domain 0. &
G. Co. v. McKinney (192o) 188 Ky. 183, 221 S. W. 245; Barnes v. Winona Oil
Co. (i921) 83 Okla. 253, 200 Pac. 985; Zelna Oil Co. v. Neno Oil Co. (1921)
84 Okla. 217, 203 Pac. 203; Duffield v. Rosenweig (i8gi) 149 Pa. 520, 23 At. 4;
Crawford v. Forest Oil Co. (1904) 208 Pa. 5, 57 AtI. 47; Bender v. Brooks
(1913) 1O3 Tex. 329, 127 S. W. 168; "Bettinan v. Harness, supra note 3; 36
L. R. A. 566; Haskell v. Sutton (1903) 53 W. Va. 2o6, 44 S. E. 533; Pittsburg
Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co. (1919, W. Va.) IOO S. E. 296, 7 A. L. R. 9O3.
' Bruner v. Hicks (9o7) 230 Ill. 536, 82 N. E. 889; Watford 0. & G. Co. v.
Shifnnan (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 531; Poe v. Ulrey, supra note 5o; Ulrey v.
Keith (19o8) 237 Ili. 284, 86 N. E. 696; Daughtee v. Ohio Oil Co. (1914) 263 IlL
518, 1O5 N. E. 308; People v. Bell (1908) 237 Ill. 332, 86 N. E. 593; Guffey v.
Smith, supra note 51; Brennan v. Hiniter (1918) 68 Okla. 112, 172 Pac. 49;
Northwestern 0. & G. Co. v. Branine (918) 71 Okla. 167, 175 Pac. 533; Rich v.
Doneghey (1918) 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86; Lindley v. Raydure, supra note 31;
Lyon v. Union G. & 0. Co. (1921, E. D. Ky.) 274 Fed. 957; McCullough v.
Smith (917, C. C. A. 8th) 243 Fed. 823; Smith v. McCullough (1922, C. C. A.
8th) 285 Fed. 698; Ewert v. Robinson (1923, C. C. A. 8th) 289 Fed. 74o; Shaffer
v. Marks, supra note 31.
' Texas Co. v. Daugherty (0915, Tex.) 176 C. W. 717; Stephens County v. Mid
Kansas Oil Co. (1923, Tex.) 254 S. W. 290; Munsey v. Marnett 0. & G. Co.
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The theory that the payment of oil and gas royalties constituted the
sole and moving consideration from the lessee to the lessor for the grant
by the lessor of the privilege to operate the land for oil and gas, had
its origin in the earlier stages of the industry. In the earlier leases, as
stated above, the cash consideration was usually nominal, the lessee
covenanted to immediately develop the premises to success or abandon-
ment and pay stipulated royalties or suffer forfeiture of his lease. But
with the introduction of the "drill or pay" or "unless" type of lease and
the "surrender" clause, the lessee no longer covenanted absolutely to
develop the land immediately, but promised to drill, pay a delay rental,
surrender it, or allow it to terminate by failure to pay. Under such
a type of lease it camiot be said that the prospective royalties are the
only consideration inducing the lessor to execute the lease, and this is
particularly true where a cash bonus is paid based on a prospective
value of the land for oil and gas purposes. But .despite this change
in type of leases the statement of the earlier cases that royalties were
the only consideration has persisted in later decisions."4
The fusion of these two ideas, that is, that an oil and gas lease is
merely an executory contract creating no present interest in the land,
and that the sole consideration moving from the lessee to the lessor is
the promise to pay royalties, to reach the erroneous conclusion that
where the lease contains an optional drilling clause coupled with a "sur-
render" clause that the lease is an unperformed contract, optional as
to one party and therefore optional as to both, is clearly traceable to a
number of cases.55 Had the courts not reasoned from these two false
premises, they would certainly have reached the conclusion that an oil
(1923, Tex.) 254 S. W. 311; Robinson v. Jacobs (1923, Tex.) 254 S. W. 309;
Texas Co. v. Davis (1923, Tex.) 254 S. W. 3o4; Thomason v. Ham (1923, Tex.)
254 S. W. 316; Thoinason v. Mclntire (1923, Tex.) 254 S. W. 315; Caruthers v.
Leonard (1923, Tex. Comm. App.) 254 S. W. 779.
Huggins v. Daley, supra note 3; Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, supra note I; and
also the following cases cited supra in note 3: Steelstnith v. Gartlan, Foster v.
Elk Fork 0. & G. Co., Gadbury v. Ohio & Ind. Gas Co., Cowan v. Radford Iron
Co., Knight v. Imd. C. & I. Co., Fed. Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., Witherspoon v.
Staley, Snmith v. Guffey, Owens v. Corsciana Pet. Co., Gt. Western Oil Co. v.
Carpenter. Long v. Sun Co., Jennings Hacywood Synd. v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil
Co., Murray v. Barnhart. Dill v. Fraze. Ohio Oil Co. v. Detamore, Mansfield
Gas Co. v. Alexander, Berry v. Frisbie, Bay St. Pet. Co. v. Penn Lubricating Co.,
Flanagan v. Marsh.
' Cowan v. Radford Iron Co., supra note 3; Steelsinith v. Gartlan, supra note
3; Huggins v. Daley, supra note 3; Reese v. Zinn (igoo, C. C. D. W. Va.) 1o3
Fed. 97; Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn. Oil Co., supra note 9; Fed. Oil Co. v.
Western Oil Co., supra note 3; Trees v. Eclipse Oil Co., supra note 25; National
0. & P. L. Co. v. Teel (i902, Tex. Civ. App.) 67 S. W. 545; H odges v. Brice
(1903) 32 Tex. Civ. App. 358, 74 S. W. 59o; Roberts v. McFadden (1903) 32
Tex. Civ. App. 47, 74 S. W. iii; Enery v. League, supra note 42; Pet. Co. v.
Oliver (19o4, Tex. Civ. App.) 79 S. W. 884; Witherspoon v. Staley, supra note
54; Owens v. Corsciana Pet. Co., supra note 3; Brown v. Wilson (1916) 58 Okla.
392, 16o Pac. 94.
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and gas lease is a conveyance of a presently vested interest in land,
creating an estate for years, on limitations or condition subsequent, and
most of the litigation as to whether or not as a contract such lease is
based upon sufficient consideration would have been avoided. But they
considered it as a contract, and it is on this basis that most of the cases,
whether they have held the leases good or bad, have been decided.
Therefore, in the discussion of this phase of the subject the leases will
be considered from the standpoint of their validity as contracts without
regard to whether or not they are conveyances of interests in land.
For the purposes of clarity, the discussion will be based upon a number
of hypothetical cases.
i. Suppose an oil and gas lease for a long certain term of years
does not contain a recital or acknowledgment of the receipt of an
initial cash consideration, but purports to be made in the consideration
of a promise by the lessee to pay royalties, if the lessee deems it advis-
able within a certain definite period to explore the land and produce oil
and gas therefrom. There is no unconditional promise to drill or to
produce oil-and gas if found. In such a case the Supreme Court of
Tennessee properly held that the lease was void for the reason that
there was no absolute promise on the part of the lessee which imposed
any legal duty upon him to serve as a consideration for the promise of
the lessor.58
2. Suppose the lease is without a recital or acknowledgment of
receipt of an initial cash consideration, but purports to be made in
consideration of certain covenants on the part of the lessee, and the
lessee covenants to pay royalties, to drill a well on the premises within
a specified time, or in lieu thereof pay a certain rental ("drill or pay"
clause), and in addition the lessee is given power to surrender the lease
at any time, without being required to pay an additional consideration
as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. In a West
Virginia case57 such a lease has been held void. The reason assigned
for this holding was that because of the presence of the surrender
clause the lessee was under no binding duty 'to do any act of benefit
to the lessor which served as consideration for the lessee's privilege to
drill on the land. This view seems sound, although a contrary view
has been asserted by some authorities. In a dissenting opinion to the
West Virginia case, one judge took the view58 that since the lessor
'Pet. Co. v. Coal, Coke & Mfg. Co., supra note i.
"Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., sapra note 9; Trees v. Eclipse Oil Co.,
supra note 25.
" "What consideration is there? The owner wants his land developed. He
cannot do so himself. By the contract- he has a chance, a fair probability, of the
other man's doing it for him: and if not that, the chance, the probability, of
getting an agreed rental. He made the lease for this consideration. The con-
sideration though not concurrent or executed is executory. The one had the
chance of benefit. That is a consideration binding him. The other ran the risk
of detriment. That makes the lease good in his favor against the other."
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wanted his land developed and could not do it himself, that the probabil-
ity of the lessee's performance, that is, drilling or paying, although not
bound to do so, conferred a benefit upon the lessor, and furnished
stifficient consideration to support the contract. But according to the
orthodox theory of consideration the beneficial liability thus created in
the lessor does not seem to be a sufficient consideration to support the
contract.
2a. If, however, in the type of lease under consideration, there be
added a clause placing a duty upon the lessee to pay a sum of money,
nominal or substantial, as a condition precedent to the exercise of the
power of surrender, the lease is not without consideration to support
it. The lessee has made an absolute promise to do one of three things.
He must drill, pay delay rental, or pay a sum of money to the lessor to
free himself from his other duty."9
2b. If the surrender clause in such a lease contains a provision that
as a condition precedent to'its exercise the lessee must pay all accrued
rentals, and this is the only condition precedent, such a clause does not
provide a valid consideration for the contract from its inception, for the
reason that the lessee may surrender before rent has accrued and thus
escape all obligations by such act. If, however, the lessor has not elected
to withdraw his own pr6mise until rent has accrued, it seems only log-
ical that he could not afterwards do so, because under the "drill or pay"
lease the lessee is then bound to pay the rent under any circumstances.
3. Suppose the lease does not recite or acknowledge the payment of
an initial cash consideration, but contains a covenant to pay royalties
and to drill within a specified time, but with a provision that if the lessee
does not drill within the time mentioned the lease is to terminate, unless
the lessee pays certain sums periodically in advance to keep the lease
alive ("unless" drilling clause). Such a lease does not place a binding
duty upon the lessee to do anything. The contract is in effect the same
as a "drill or pay" lease coupled with a simple "surrender" clause. The
lessee is not bound to drill or to pay. If he does not drill or pay the
lease ends by its own terms. Some courts, however, have recently
expressed the opinion that a promise to drill in an "unless" lease is
sufficient consideration to support it. 0
3a. The addition of a "surrender" clause, even though such clause
requires the lessee to pay a sum of money or accrued rentals as a con-
Brannon, J. dissenting, Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., supra note 9; see
also McCaskey v. Schrock (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 418, where it was
held that a promise to drill in an "unless" lease was sufficient to support the
contract although the recited consideration was not paid. This opinion overlooks
the fact that under the "unless" drilling clause the lessee was under no duty to
drill or pay. See also McCaskey v. McCall (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 26 S. W.
432; Heard v. Pratt (1924, Tex. Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 66o; Marnett 0. & G.
Co. v. Munsey (i921, Tex. Civ. App.) 232 S. W. 867.
' Rich v. Doneghey, supra note 3.
' McCaskey v. Schrock, supra note 58; McCaskey v. McCall, supra note 58.
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dition precedent to the exercise of the power to surrender, does not
create any different situation, for the reason that the lessee has not
made a promise to pay to escape which the instrumentality of the "sur-
render" clause is needed, and he may escape his promise to drill by
simply not performing it and allowing the lease to terminate.
6 '
4. Suppose the lease contains a recital of an initial consideration of
one dollar, covenants on part of the lessee to drill within a certain time
but if he does not the lease will be void unless the lessee pay a stipulated
sum in advance for its further continuance. Although the lessee is
not bound absolutely to drill- or to pay, the one dollar consideration
recited supports the lease as a whole. This type of lease has not often
been questioned in the courts, but has practically always been upheld as
supported by valid consideration when questioned even though there
is no promise to drill.
6 2
4a. But where there is added to this lease a power in the lessee
to surrender, with or without payment of an additional consideration,
nominal or substantial, it has been attacked. These courts have not
realized, however, that the addition of the surrender clause has not in
any respect relieved the lessee of any duty that he has had," but other
courts have supported such contracts upon the ground that the initial
consideration supports all parts of the lease including the surrender
clause.6 4 The error of the former view will be discussed now.
5. Suppose that a lease contains a recital or acknowledgment of the
receipt of an initial cash consideration of one dollar or other nominal
sum, covenants on the part of the lessee to pay royalties, to drill within
a certain time or pay delay rentals (drill or pay clause) with an added
power to surrender, with or without paying an additional nominal or
serious consideration as a condition precedent to the exercise of the
power. It is with respect to this type of lease that most of the litigation
questioning the validity of oil and gas leases for want of consideration
has occurred. And it is here that some of the courts have been
influenced by the notion that oil and gas leases are purely executory
contracts, the promise of the lessee to develop the land and pay oil or
'In Fed. Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., supra note 3, the lease was objected to
because of the surrender clause, although it might have well been declared invalid
for the same reason, because of the "unless" drilling clause.
'South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass (1912) 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961, 43
L. R A. (N. s.) 848; Brawnm v. Fowler (19o2) 65 Ohio St. 507, 63 N. E. 76;
Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder (igoo, C. C. A. 6th) io6 Fed. 764; Miller v. Union
Gas Co. (924, C. C. A. 6th) 295 Fed. 27; Leeper v. Neely, supra note 31;
Brunson v. Carter Oil Co. (igig, E. D. Okla.) 259 Fed. 656; Lone Star Gas Co.
v. McCidlough (I92O, Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S. W. 1114; Hopkins v. Zeigler
(1919, C. C. A. 6th) 259 Fed. 43; Marnett 0. & G. Co. v. Munsey (1921, Tex.
Civ. App.) 232 S. W. 869; Garfield Oil Co. v. Champlin (192o, Okla.) 169
Pac. 514.
'Fed. Oil Co. v Western Oil Co., supra note 3.
" See cases cited in note 55. The question of the validity of the "unless lease"
where dependent upon nominal consideration is discussed under supposition case
five infra.
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gas royalties ,being the total consideration moving* from the lessee to
the lessor. And it is on this basis that they have held that since the
surrender clause permits the lessee to escape this duty, the contract is
void. The courts have two expressions through which they voice their
opinion that such an oil and gas lease is invalid and may be cancelled
at the will of the lessor. One, "that contracts, unperformed,& optional
as to one of the parties, are optional as to both," and the other, "that
the contract is unilateral, and void because lacking in mutuality." The
first statement has reference only to contracts depending entirely for
their validity on mutual promises6 5 and to be applicable to the contracts
here involved the initial cash consideration must be entirely disregarded.
The second statement is misleading. Unilateral cohtracts are not
necessarily void, or void because lacking in mutuality of obligation. The
term unilateral has in the law of contract been used to describe two
entirely different situations. The correct use of the term is to describe
a contract where one patty has performed his part of the consideration
and there is an outstanding promise to perform on the part of one
party only. In such contracts there is no mutuality of outstanding
obligation. But the term unilateral is sometimes fised to indicate a
situation where one party has made a promise for which no sufficient
consideration is given. Such a situation is really not a contract at all,
for the simple reason that it does not have sufficient consideration to
support it.6S It is believed that it is this second use of the term
unilateral that the courts have had in mind when they speak of oil and
gas leases as unilateral contracts. The lack of mutuality referred to by
them is a lack of mutuality of consideration and not mutuality of obli-
gation. If the premise upon which these courts proceed is sound, that
is, that prospective royalties are the sole and only consideration for the
promise of the lessor, then certainly their second ground, that is, that
the contract is unilateral and void for want of mutuality, using the
terms as above indicated, is sound. But this, as well as the first reason
given, is based upon the assumption that the recited or acknowledged
nominal consideration is not sufficient to support the contract.
"It is," says Professor Williston,6 7 "an 'elementary principle that the
law will not enter into an inquiry as to the adequacy of the considera-
tion.' 68 This rule is almost as old as the law of consideration itself.
Therefore, anything which fulfills the requirements of consideration
whatever may be the comparative value of the consideration, and of the
thing promised."
Relying upon this principle a great majority of the courts in the oil
and gas producing states have held that one dollar is a sufficient con-
esi Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 140; 6 R. C. L. 686; 13 C. J. 336; Rich v.
Doneghey, supra note 3.
Mi Williston, op. cit. sec. 13.
i Williston, op. cit. sec. 115.
* Byles, J. in Westlake v. Adams (858, C. P.) 5 C. B. (N2 s.) 248, 265, 141
Eng. Rep. 99, io6; 6 R. C. L. 678; 13 C. J. 365; Rich v. Doneghey, supra note 3.
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zideration to support an oil and gas lease in which there is no binding
duty on the lessee to drill or to pay rental. And they so hold, whether
they view such a lease as a valid option to acquire an interest in land or
as a contract partially executed by the payment of the initial consider-
ation. The presence of a "surrender" clause, whether with or without
an independent consideration to support it, is immaterial under such a
view, for the initial consideration supports the whole contract."9
. In some cases, however, the rule that consideration need not be
adequate has been ignored with the result that the lease has been looked
upon as an executory contract, and because of the presence of the
"surrender" clause, held void for want of consideration. 70  This erro-
neous view, as heretofore suggested, is directly traceable to the influence
'Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co. (191i) 68 W. Va. 667, 70 S. E. 707, Ann. Cas.
1912B, 360, note; Lowther Oil Co. v. Guiffey (1903) 52 W. Va. 88, 43 S. E. ioi;
Pyle v. Henderson (19o9) 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. 762; South Penn Oil Co. v.
Snwdgrass, supra note 62; Cent. Ohio Nat. G. & F. Co. vz. Eckert (1904) 70 Ohio
St 127, 71 N. E. .g1 ; Brown v. Fowler' (igoi) 65 Ohio St 507, 63 N. E. 76;
Poe v. Ulrey (9o8) 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46; Watford 0. & G. Co. v. Shipman
(19o8) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53; Pittsburg V. P. & B. Co. v. Bailey, supra note 31;
G'adbury v. Ohio & I d. Gas Co. (1903) 162 Ind. 9, 67 N. E. 259; Dill vz. Fraze
(1907) 169 Ind. 53, 79 N. _ 971 ; Rechard v. Cowley, supra note 3I ; Gillespie v.
Fulton Oil Co. (19o8) 236 Ill. 188, 86 N. E. 219; Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.,
supra note 52; Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder, supra note 62; Miller v. Union Gas
Marks, supra note 31; Raydure v. Lindley, supra note 31; McCullough v. Smith,
supra note 52; Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder supra note 62; Miller v. Union Gas
Co., supra note 62; Leeper v. Neely, supra note 31; Brunson v. Carter Oil Co.,
supra note 52; Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder, supra note 62; Miller v. Union Gas
Okla.) 176 Pac. 912; Ardizonne v. Archer (i9i, Okla.) 177 Pac. 554; Garfield
Oil Co. v. Champlin (I92O, Okla.) 189 Pac. 514; Southwestern 0. & G. Co. v.
McDaniel (1918, Okla.) 175 Pac. 92o; Nat. 0. & P. L. v. Teel, supra note 3;
Witherspoon v. Staley (1913, Tex.) 159 S. W. XXIII (without opinion);
Gt. Western Oil Co. v. Carpenter (19o6) 43 Tex. Civ. App. 229, 95 S. W. 57;
Corsciana Pet. Co. v. Ow'ns, supra note 31; Pierce-Fordyce Oil Assoc. z
Woodrum (I916, Tex. Civ. App.) 188 S. W. 245; Richnmond v. Hog Creek Oil
Co. (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 229 S. W. 563; Hitson v. Gilman (I92O, Tex. Civ.
App.) 22o S. W. 14o; Johnson v. Russel (I92O, Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S. W. 352;
Bost v. Biggers Bros. (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S. W. IO; Leath v. HRumble
0. & Ref. Co. (192o, Tex. Civ. App,) 223 S. W. 1022; McCaskey v. Schrock,
supra note 58; Lone Star Gas Co. v. McCullough (192o, Te=. Civ. App.) 22o
S. W. 114; Nolan v. Young (19i2o, Tex. Civ.-App.) 220 S. W. 154; McKay v.
Talley (1920o, Tex. Ci. App.) 22o S. W. 167; McKay v. Lucas (I92o, Tex. Civ.
App.) 22o S. W. 172; McKay v. Kilcrease ((I92O, Tex. Civ. App.) 22o S. W.
177; Erode v. Johnson (1919, Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 575; McCaskey v.
McCall, supra note 58; Stephenson v. Stitz (I921, Tex. Civ. App.) 235 S. W.
271; Dunaway v. Galbraith (I919) 139 Ark. 580, 214 S. W. 33; Lawrence v.
Mahoney (19i2o) 145 Ark. 310, 225 S. W. 340; Rogers v. Magnolia Oil Co., supra
note 31; Dorman Farms Co. v. Stewart (1923, Ark.) 247 S. W. 778; Grooms v.
Minton, supra note 31.
" Steelsmith v. Gartlan, supra note 6, 44 L. 1_ A. io7; Huggins v. Daley, supra
note 3; Fed. Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., supra note 3; Nat'l 0. & P. L. Co. 7).
Teel, supra note 42; Hodges v. Brice (1903) 32 Tex. Civ. App. 358, 74 S. W. 590;
Roberts v. McFadden, supra note 42; Emery v. League, supra note 42; Pet. Co.
v. Oliver (I9o4, Tex. Civ. App.) 79 S. W. 884; Witherspoon v. Staley, supra
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of the doctrine of the Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts71 and to the statemenL
'in early cases that the promise of the lessee to pay rents and royalties
is the sole consideration moving from him. This minority view had its
beginnings in West Virginia state and federal cases.72 It was furthered
by Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co.,73 and National Oil Pipe Line
Co. v. Teel.7 4  In the first of these cases the action was brought by the
lessee to enforce a lease which recited a consideration of one dollar,
contained an "unless" drilling clause and a surrender clause. The
cotirt refused to enforce the lease, among other grounds, because the
"consideration would be so trifling, compared with the value of the
leasehold interest as to shock the moral sense," although the court
admitted that such a lease might be valid in law and not subject to can-
cellation in equity at the suit of the lessor. Although this case was
later overruled by the Supreme Court7 5 it had considerable influence
with the Texas and Oklahoma courts.
7 6
In the Teel case, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, in a suit by the
lessor against a bona fide assignee for value, cancelled a lease for fraud
which recited 'a one dollar consideration and contained an "unless"
drilling clause. This was done on the ground that the contract did not
create an interest in land, but was merely an option to procure one,
because the real consideration was the development of the property, for
which no definite time was fixed in the lease. Although the Supreme
Court of Texas affirmed the decision on the ground of fraud, it took
pains to state that it considered the recited consideration sufficient to
support the option.77  Despite this statement of the Supreme Court,
and later statements to the same effect,78 several decisions in the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals, relying upon the first opinion in the Teel case,
supra, Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., supra, and the early West
Virginia cases above mentioned, have held that a nominal consideratibn
is not sufficient to support an oil and gas lease where the lessee is not
note 42; Owens v. Corsciana Pet. Co. (1914, ex. Civ. App.) 169 S. W. 2o0;
Btrown v. Wilson (1916) 58 Okla. 392, i6o Pac. 94; Heard!v..Pratt (x924, Tex.
Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 66o.
"Supra note 47.
"' See cases cited smcpra note 70.
Supra note 63.
(19o2, Tex. Civ. App.) 67 S. W. 545.
"Guffey v. Smith, supra note 51.
' See Texas and Oklahoma cases cited supra in note 70.
¢' "Each of the contracts in this case purports upon its face to have been
executed in consideration of the payment of one dollar; and, though the plaintiff
below pleaded that no consideration was paid, there was no evidence that the
recital as to the consideration in the contracts was not true. Whether the recital
of '$i'---commonly called a nominal consideration,-is sufficient to support the
contracts, we need not discuss, though there is very high authority for holding
that such recital is sufficient for the purpose." Nat'l 0. & P. L. Co. v. Teel
(i9o2) 95 Tex. 586, 68 S. W. 979.
8 See also the statement made by the Supreme Court of Texas, Witherspoon v.
Staley, szpra note 69, in refusing a writ of error to review a decision of the Civil
Court of Appeals.
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bound to drill or pay. 9 The last of these cases, Owens v. Corsciana
Petroeum4A Co.,80 was appealed to the Supreme Court and the question
was definitely settled in favor of the validity of such leases.8
The Oklahoma court in a number of cases 82 refused specific per-
formance of leases made on a nominal consideration which contained
an "unless" drilling clause or a "surrender" clause on the principles
of Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co. But it was not until the
decision of Brown v. Wilson5 3 that these principles were invoked to
permit the lessee to cancel the lease. In that case it was held that the
initial consideration supported the lease for the exploratory period only,
and thereafter, if the lessee had not developed the land, the lease was
voidable at the option of the lessor because without consideration to
support it. This decision was, however, overruled by Northwestern
Oil & Gas Co. v. Branine8' and Rich v. Doneghey8' where it was held
that one dollar initial consideration supports the entire lease.
There may be some doubt as to the exact attitude of the Kentucky
court on the question under discussion, although in a recent federal
case in that jurisdiction wherein he was bound by the rule of the state
courts, Cochran, J., after an exhaustive review of the cases, held that
a consideration of one dollar was sufficient to support a lease containing
a "drill or pay" clause and a "surrender" clause.8 6
In Louisiana, where the code requires that consideration must be
"serious" and the doctrine of the common law that consideration need
not be adequate is not in force, it has been held in several cases, that
a lease supported only by a nominal consideration is invalid . 7  If the
initial consideration prove inadequate, the lease may be held valid,
although it contain a "surrender" clause, if as a condition precedent
' See Texas cases cited supra in note 70.
'oSupra note 3.
Corsciana Pet. Co. v. Owen, supra note 31; but see Heard v. Pratt (1924,
Tex. Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 66o, where the court said, "The nominal considera-
tion, of course, was inadequate, but that was not the sole and real consideration."
' Kolachny v. Galbreath, supra note 48; Superior 0. & G. Co. v. Mehlin
(191o) 25 Okla. 8o9, io8 Pac. 545; Hill 0. & G. Co. v. White (1916) 53 Okla.
748, 157 Pac. 710; Melton v. Cherokee 0. & G. Co. (1917) 67 Okla. 247, 170
Pac. 691; Lima 0. & G. Co. v. Pritchard (1923, Okla.) 218 Pac. 863.
'Supra note 70.
" (1918) 71 Okla. 1O7, 175 Pac. 533.
" Supra note 3.
'Rayditre v. Lindley, supra note 31; Montarch 0. & G. Co. v. Richardson
(1907) 124 Ky. 602, 99 S. W. 668; Berry v. F?isbie (9o5) I2O Ky. 337, 86
S. W. 558; Soaper v. King (115) 167 Ky. 121, i8o S. W. 46. See also Leeper v.
Neely, supra note 31.
"Murray v. Barnhart (19o6) 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489; Houssiere-Latreille Oil
Co. v. Jennings-Heywood Synd. (905) 115 La. 107, 38 So. 932 (see note 3 on
rehearing) ; Gray v. Spring (i9ri) 129 La. 345, 56 So. 305; Goodson v. Vivian
Oil Co. (1912) 129 La. 951, 57 So. 28o; Long v. Sun Co., supra note 3; Cadeo
0. & M, Co. v. Producer's Oil Co. (1914) 134 La. 701, 64 So. 648; Saunders v.
B sch Everett & Co. (I916) 138 La. 154, 71 So. 153; Bristow v. Christine 0. &
G. Co. (1916) 139 La. IO0O, 72 So. 718; Leonard v. Busch Everett & Co. (1916)
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to the exercise of the power to surrender the lessee must pay a "serious"
consideration, or if there is any other binding executory or executed
consideration to support it.8
Although it seems settled law in all jurisdictions except Louisiana
that one dollar is sufficient consideration to support an oil and gas lease,
the validity of all leases made upon such recited consideration is not
necessarily established. The recital of a nominal consideration being
merely a statement of past fact, parol evidence -may be admitted to
show the recited fact untrue, or that the consideration. has not been
paid. If, however, the consideration stated is in the form of a promise,
parol evidence is inadmissible.8 9 In an early case Story, J., said:
"The guarantor acknowledged the receipt of one dollar, and is now
estopped to deny it. If she had not received it, she would now be
entitled to recover."90  The error of this is in treating the acknowledg-
ment of the receipt, although the money was not paid, as a promise to
pay, thus giving the recital of consideration the characteristics of a
promise and barring all parol testimony as to the truth by making the
parol evidence rule applicable. To what extent this statement has mis-
led the courts in refusing evidence offered to prove that a recited con-
sideration in an oil and gas lease was not in fact paid or ever intended
to be paid can only be surmised. In some oil and gas cases such
evidence has been refused,91 in others it has been admitted, 92 and still
others say that it makes no difference whether the nominal considera-
tion is paid or not for the recital amounts to a promise to pay which
supports the lease.93  This last holding is in direct reliance upon the
authority of Justice Story's statement above quoted.
Since in practically all jurisdictions a nominal consideration is suffi-
139 La. 1099, 72 So. 749; Rahnes v. Duwson (1919) 145 La. 525, 82 So. 6go;
Garrett v. Schreveport L. & M. Co. (19-2) 151 La. 983, 92 So. 565; Wilder v.
Norman (1920) 147 La. 413, 85 So. 59; Wilder v. Jackson (1922) 15o La. 864,
91 So. 245; Miller v. Oden (1921) 149 La. 771, 90 So. 167.
' Wilkins v: Nelson (1924) 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607; Fomby v. Columbia County
Dev. Co. (1924), 155 La. 705, 99 So. 537; Glrssel v. Richardson Oil Co. (1922)
15o La. 999, 91 So. 431; Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co. v. Jennings-Heywood Synd.,
supra note 87; Saunders v. Busch Everett & Co., supra note 87; Hudspeth v.
Producer's Oil Co. (1914) 134 La. 1013, 64 So. 891; McClendon v. Busch Everett
Oil Co. (1916) 138 La. 722, 70 So. 781; Cochran v. Gulf Ref. Co. (1916) 139 La.
1010, 72 So. 718.
si Williston, op. cit., supra note 66, sec. ii5a, 115b; 4 Wigmore, Evidence
(19o4) sec. 2433; io R. C. L. io44
'Lawrence v. McCahnwnt (1844, U. S.) 2 How. 426; Davis v. Wells (i88i)
104 U. S. 159.
"See Raydure v. Liudley, supra note 31; Stephenson v. Stits (1921, Tex. Civ.
App.) 235 S. W. 271; Nolan v. Young (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S W. 154.
'Hitson v. Gilman (1920, Tex. Civ. App.) 22o S. W. 14o; Varnes v. Dean
(192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 228 S. W. 1017; McCaskey v. Schrock, supra note 58.
"McKay v. Talley, supra note 69; Bost v. Biggers Bros., supra note 69;
Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co. (1923, Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. 908; Silverman
v. Enerson (1924, Tex. Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 612. These cases rely upon the
statement found in 13 C. J. 367 where Story's statement is paraphrased.
VALIDITY OF OIL AND GAS LEASES
dent to support an oil and gas lease regardless of the type of drilling
clause, or the presence of a surrender clause, it is only necessary to
state that leases are held valid when made upon payment of a sub-
stantial cash bonus." In Louisiana, however, the court must always be
satisfied that the cash bonus is adequate.9 It must likewise not be
overlooked, in all the situations heretofore discussed, that if there is no
consideration in the form of initial cash payment, nominal or substan-
tial, or any binding promise to drill or pay rentals because of the
"surrender" clause or "unless" drilling clause, or if the cash considera-
tion has not been paid or intended to be paid, a majority of the courts
hold that the lessor cannot cancel the lease if the lessee has drilled or
the lessor has received rental payments.""
In Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co.,97 the action was by the lessee
in equity to remove the cloud from his title created by the second lease
and to prevent the second lessee from drilling on the land. Due to the
influence of the doctrine of Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts98 and the theory
that prospective royalties constituted the sole consideration moving
from the lessee for the lease, the court viewed the action as one for
specific performance of an executory contract. The initial cash con-
sideration and the monthly payments made by the lessee were entirely
disregarded with the result that no consideration remained to support
the contract except the probability that the lessee might develop the
property. On this premise the court denied the lessee's suit on the
ground of lack of mutuality of equitable remedy and on the ground of
unfairness. The lease was said to be unfair because the lease stated
no term beyond which the lessee might not delay drilling by making
monthly payments. This asserted unfairness has found expression
"Pyle v. Henderson (19o9) 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. 762; Harness v. Eastern
Oil Co. (1901) 49 W. Va. 250, 38 S. E. 662; Buie v. Porter (1921, Tex. Civ.
App.) 228 S. W. 999; Griffin v. Bell (1918, Tex. Civ. App.) 202 S. W. 1034;
Tatum v. Fulton (1920, Tex. Civ. App.) 218 S.'W. lo88; Patton v. Texas Pac.
C. & 0. Co. (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 857; Morris v. Tex. Pac. C. &
0. Co. (1921, Tex. Civ. App.) 228 S. W. 981; Northwestern 0. & G. Co. V.
Branine (I918) 71 Okla- 107, 175 Pac. 533, 3 A. L. R. 344; Magiolia Pet. Co. v.
Saylor (1919) 72 Okla. 282, i8o Pac. 861; Carter Oil Co. v. Tiffin (1918, Okla-)
176 Pac. 912; Southwestern Oil Co. v. McDaniel (1918) 71 Okla 142, 175 Pac.
920; Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty (1918) 71 Okla. 275, 177 Pac. 1O4; McCray v.
Miller (1919) 78 Okla. 16, 184 Pac. 781; Maid 0. & G. Co. v. Bodkin (1919)
75 Okla. 6, 18o Pac. 959; Pucini v. Bumgarner (1918) 71 Okla. 105, 175 Pac. 537;
Shaffer v. Marks, supra note 31.
" See cases cited supra in notes 87, 88.
'Broyles v. Gilman (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S. W. 685; Canon v. Scott
(1921, Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. 1O42; Hunter v. Gulf Prod. Co. (1919, Tex.
Civ. App.) 220 S. W. 163; Heard v. Pratt (1924, Tex. Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 66o;
Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co. v. Jennings-Heywood Synd., supra note 87; Busch
Everett Co. v. Vivian Oil Co. (1911) 128 La. 886, 55 So. 564; McClendon v.
Busch Everett Co. (1916) 138 La. 722, 70 So. 781; contra: Fed. Oil Co. v.




in some jurisdictions and made grounds of the cancellation of leases
by the lessor,9  but has been repudiated in others on the ground that
the lessor has an implied power of forfeiture for unreasonable delay
in drilling.100 The question as to whether the action should have been
denied because of lack of mutuality of equitable remedy is reserved for
discussion elsewhere. 10 But the original premise of the court, that is,
that the lease created contractual relations and that the action was 6ne
for specific performance, needs attention.
The courts'of Indiana,10 2 Oklahoma, 1' 0 and Illinois'" have followed
the Federal Oil Co. case in denying actions by lessees seeking protec-
tion of their legal interests as against the lessor and subsequent lessees.
A federal court in Illinois made a like decision.' 5 Upon appeal of
this case to the Supreme Court, it said :106 "Rightly understood, this
is not a suit for specific performance. Its purpose is not to enforce
an executory contract ,to give a lease, or even to enforce an executory
promise in a lease already given, but to protect a present vested lease-
hold, amounting to a freehold interest, from continuing an irreparable
injury calculated to accomplish its practical destruction. The complaint
is not that performance of some promised act is being withheld or
refused, but complainants' vested freehold right is being wrongfully
violated and impaired in a way which calls for preventive relief. In
this respect the case is not materially different from what it would be
if the complainants were claiming under an absolute conveyance rather
than a lease. This view of the Supreme Court has been followed in
several cases.'0 7  Its effect is to bring the courts to a realization that
an oil and gas lease after all creates a presently vested interest in land,
and that the validity of the instrument creating that interest should not
be tested on the basis of consideration as if it were an executory con-
tract, but as a conveyance of land.
'Nat'l 0. & P. L. Co. v. Teel, .supra note 55; Bristow v. Christine 0. & G.
Co., supra note 87; Long v. Sun Co., supra note 3.
' New American 0. & M. Co. v. Troyer, sapra note 31; Lone Star Gas Co. v
McCullough (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S. W. 1114; McKay v. Kilcrease (192o,
Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S. W. 177.
101 See criticism of Ulrey v. Keith, supra note 52, by Schofield in COMMENT
(09o8-o9) 3 ILL. LAw REv. 43, 6oi, 608, on this point.
1 Advance Oil Co. v. Hunt (1917) 66 Ind. App. 228, 116 N. E. 340.
... Kolacmy v. Galbreath, supra note 48; Superior 0. & G. Co. v. Mehrin
(191o) 25 Okla. 8og, io8 Pac. 545; Hill 0. & G. Co. v. White (1916) 53 Okla.
748, 157 Pac. 710; Melton v. Cherokee 0. & G. Co. (1917) 67 Okla. 247, 170 Pac.
691; Lima 0. & G. Co. v. Pritchard, supra note 38.
10 Ulrey v. Keith, supra note ioi; Watford 0. & G. Co. v. Shipinan (igos)
233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53.
' 5niith v. Guffey (1912, C. C. A. 7th) 202 Fed. io6.
'o' Guffey v, Smith, supra note 51.
102 Shaffer v. Marks, supra note 31; Brunson v. Carter Oil Co., sapra note 62;
Smith v. McCullough (1922, C. C. A. 8th) 285 Fed. 698; Lindley v. Raydure,
supra note 31; Rich v. Doneghey, supra note 3; Corscian Pet. Co. v. Owens,
sitpra note 31.
